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AN ONLINE DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR
INFERRING POLICY ROUTING CONFIGURATIONS
SAMUEL EPSTEIN
ABSTRACT
We present an online distributed algorithm, the Causation Logging Algorithm (CLA),
in which Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet individually report route oscil-
lations/flaps they experience to a central Internet Routing Registry (IRR). The IRR
aggregates these reports and may observe what we call causation chains where each
node on the chain caused a route flap at the next node along the chain. A chain may
also have a causation cycle. The type of an observed causation chain/cycle allows the
IRR to infer the underlying policy routing configuration (i.e., the system of economic
relationships and constraints on route/path preferences).
Our algorithm is based on a formal policy routing model that captures the propaga-
tion dynamics of route flaps under arbitrary changes in topology or path preferences.
We derive invariant properties of causation chains/cycles for ASes which conform to
economic relationships based on the popular Gao-Rexford model. The Gao-Rexford
model is known to be safe in the sense that the system always converges to a stable
set of paths under static conditions. Our CLA algorithm recovers the type/property
of an observed causation chain of an underlying system and determines whether it
conforms to the safe economic Gao-Rexford model. Causes for nonconformity can be
diagnosed by comparing the properties of the causation chains with those predicted
from different variants of the Gao-Rexford model.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the de-facto inter-domain routing
protocol employed in the Internet. BGP allows Autonomous Systems (ASes), oper-
ated by different administrative domains (e.g., Internet Service Providers, companies,
universities) to independently apply local policies for selecting routes and propagating
routing information. Given the critical role and global scope of BGP, both its tran-
sient and steady-state performance have received significant attention, and problems
related to delayed convergence (Labovitz et al., 2001) and potential instability (Feld-
mann et al., 2004; Varadhan et al., 1996) (i.e., route oscillations/flaps) have been
identified and studied.
Route flaps, in particular, could be highly disruptive given the associated cost of
communication and processing overheads. Route flaps can be transient (i.e., short-
term) due to temporary changes in topology or route/path preferences. Route flaps
can also be persistent due to routing policies across ASes that are conflicting (i.e.,
policies can not be simultaneously satisfied) (Griffin et al., 2002). We refer to such
“conflicting” policies as an unsafe (policy) configuration.
Economic constraints that are typical of commercial relationships between ASes
in the Internet—henceforth referred to as Gao-Rexford model (Gao and Rexford,
2001)—have been shown to make BGP safe. For example, in the Gao-Rexford model,
economic relationships between ASes and constraints on path preferences are defined
as follows: an AS classifies its neighboring ASes based on their economic relationship,
2as either customer, provider, or peer. And the path preferences are restricted in a
hierarchical fashion, e.g., every AS prefers a path through a customer AS over a path
through a peer or provider AS.
Our Contribution:
Our goal in this thesis is to develop an online distributed algorithm for observing
and recording route flaps to infer the nature of the underlying policy configuration.
Such an algorithm should be efficient, and should maintain privacy, i.e., the routing
policies of an AS should not be revealed to other ASes.
To that end, we extend the static model of BGP (Griffin et al., 2002) to capture the
propagation dynamics of route updates under arbitrary changes in topology or path
preferences. We call this extended model, Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) model.
We introduce the notion of causation chains, where informally, the route flap at a
node on the chain causes a route flap at the next node along the chain. We also define
causation cycles of different types, for example, a causation cycle is simple if it starts
and terminates at the same node. (We give more formal definitions of these concepts
later in the thesis.)
The goal is then to find properties of these causation chains/cycles invariant to
arbitrary changes in topology or path preferences. We start with the Gao-Rexford
model and characterize economic relationships between adjacent ASes in causation
chains (similar to the way paths are characterized (Gao and Rexford, 2001)). For
example, we prove that all causation chains in the Gao-Rexford model do not con-
tain a provider-to-customer-to-provider sequence, referred to as ”valley-free”, thus
generalizing the result in (Obradovic, 2002) to time-varying topologies and path pref-
erences. Thus, observing these properties allow us to infer whether or not the policy
configuration conforms to the Gao-Rexford model and hence its safety.
3In order to diagnose nonconformity, we relax the conditions of Gao-Rexford and
consider six “violations” or variants of the model. For example, a less-restricted
variant may allow an AS to prefer a path through its peer over a path through its
customer—there may be legitimate economic reasons for these more relaxed routing
policies (Feamster et al., 2004; Gao et al., 2001). We again characterize the resulting
causation chains/cycles for each Gao-Rexford variant. Causes for nonconformity can
be diagnosed by comparing the properties of the observed causation chains against
those predicted by each variant.
The above machinery allows us to develop a distributed inference algorithm, called
the Causation Logging Algorithm (CLA), that can be used to test and diagnose
conformity to the Gao-Rexford model. CLA requires ASes to record and report to a
central repository, e.g., a trusted Internet Routing Registry (IRR) (Govindan et al.,
1999), their locally-observed causation tuples, that consist of itself and a neighboring
node that caused its route flap. These tuples/messages are of small size and can
be aggregated by the IRR to identify causation chains/cycles, which based on their
type, the IRR can determine whether or not the underlying system conforms to Gao-
Rexford. CLA has the following main features:
• It is efficient in the sense of small message / communication overhead, as well as
low processing overhead since only observed/realized route flaps are used—this
is in contrast to the static checking of all possible conflicts in routing policies
(whether or not they are actually realized), which is known to be NP-complete
(Griffin and Wilfong, 1999).
• It does not require an AS to reveal its private routing policies to other ASes
since only locally-observed route flaps are reported to a trusted IRR—this is in
contrast to exchanging route flaps among ASes in extended “history” messages
(Griffin and Wilfong, 2000), where an AS reveals its path preferences to every
4other AS as it adopts new paths and abandons old paths during route flaps.
• It is online and distributed, diagnosing actual behavior of ASes. Therefore
inferring the conformity (or lack thereof) to Gao-Rexford policy configurations
is done incrementally based only on observed route flaps. This is in contrast to
offline methods which use information from BGP tables (Wang and Gao, 2003).
Furthermore, not all ASes have to report their causation tuples, though in these
cases, the inference result from the IRR applies only to those segments of the
network that adopt our algorithm.
5Chapter 2
Dynamic Policy Routing Model
The Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) model is used to capture the dynamics of BGP
inter-domain routing. Each Autonomous System (AS) is represented by a node in
a graph. AS path preferences are represented by a ranking relation. The following
chapter describes DPR, extending the notation of (Griffin et al., 2002). The major
addition of DPR is that it models time-varying topologies and path preferences.
2.1 Basics of DPR
t+2
root
y0
t
y
1
y
2
root
y0 y1 y2
t+1
root
y0 y1 y2
t+3
root
y0 y1 y2
C(yi, t+ i) y0 y1 y2
t+ 1 – y0 –
t+ 2 – – y1
Figure 2·1: Causation chain Y = 〈y0 y1 y2〉t, with causation con-
ditions 1, 1, and 2, respectively. A link failure between y0 and root
occurred at time t, causing y0 to have no path to root at time t + 1.
This causes y1 to switch to a less preferred path at time t + 2 and y2
to switch to a more preferred path via y1 at time t+ 3.
Definition 1 (Time). Time is represented by a non-negative, discrete index t such
that: t = [0,∞).
6Definition 2 (Network). The network is represented by a graph G = (V,E):
• Each vertex u ∈ V represents an AS.
• Each edge in E is time dependent: (u, v)t ∈ E if u is connected to v at time t.
Conversely, a lack of connectivity between u and v at time t is represented by
(u, v)t /∈ E.
There exists a distinguished destination node, represented as root, where root ∈ V .
Definition 3 (Paths). Paths are sequences of nodes: 〈u1, u2, . . . , uk〉. The empty
path is denoted by 〈〉. All paths should end with the root node. The goal of every
node is to find a path to root. A concatenation of a node u with a path Q is represented
as: P = 〈u Q〉. A path originating from u is represented by P u. The set of paths
originating from u is represented by Pu.
Definition 4 (Path Preferences). At each time t, each node u has a unique preference
over paths originating at u. This dynamic ranking is represented by the t operator:
If u prefers P u over Qu at time t, then: P u t Qu. If u prefers P u over Qu for all t,
then: P u  Qu. Strict preference is defined by:
P u t Qu ⇔ P u t Qu and Qu 6t P u
For all times t, for each node u ∈ V , t is a total order over Pu ∪ 〈〉. Thus each
node u has an ordered preference over all its paths to root. If two paths start with
different nodes, then they have no preference relation. Forbidden paths P are those
ranked below the empty path for all times: 〈〉  P . All paths with repeating nodes
are forbidden.
Definition 5 (DPR Instance). A Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) instance consists
of a graph and a path preference D = (, G).
Definition 6 (States). At each time index t, every node u has a path to root, repre-
sented by P u = pi(u, t). The available path choices of a node, via all possible neighbors
v, are represented by Choices(u, t) where:
Choices(u, t) = 〈〉 ∪ {〈u, pi(v, t)〉; (u, v)t ∈ E}
The Best(u, t) notation represents the current best path for u:
Best(u, t) = max
t
Choices(u, t)
7The states of nodes at each time t is their best path of the previous round. For all
nodes u ∈ V :
• pi(u, 0) = 〈〉
• pi(u, t) = Best(u, t− 1)
The path used by node u at time t, pi(u, t), was its best path at time t−1, Best(u, t−1).
This best path was determined using the ranking t−1. The ρ notation is used to
represent the next-hop neighbor of a current path:
ρ(u, t) = NextHop(pi(u, t))
Definition 7 (Realized Paths). A path P u is realized iff there exists a time t such
that pi(u, t) = P u.
Theorem 1 (Forbidden Paths). Forbidden paths are never realized.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists a forbidden path P u, a node u, and a time
t such that pi(u, t) = P u. However 〈〉  P u so P u 6= Best(u, t − 1) which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 1 (Path Deconstruction). If ρ(u0, t) = u1 then pi(u0, t) = 〈u0 pi(u1, t− 1)〉
Proof. By the definition of pi, pi(u0, t) = Best(u0, t−1) so pi(u0, t) ∈ Choices(u0, t−1).
So by the definition of Choices, pi(u0, t) = 〈u0 pi(u1, t− 1)〉, where u1 = ρ(u0, t).
2.2 Causation in DPR
Definition 8 (Path Rank Changes). The following definitions describe the relative
change in the rankings of selected paths for a node:
RankDec(u, t) ⇔ pi(u, t) t pi(u, t+ 1)
RankInc(u, t) ⇔ pi(u, t) ≺t pi(u, t+ 1)
RankSame(u, t) ⇔ pi(u, t) = pi(u, t+ 1)
The relative change in rankings are with respect to the current time index’s path
ranking t.
8Definition 9 (Causation Function). During the course of the DPR model, a node u
may change its current path at a given time t. The causation function represents u’s
neighboring node v responsible for u’s path change. Causation function is the base
construct from which causation chains will be built. A causation function C maps
each node u at a given time t to a neighboring node v:
C(u, t) = v
Table 2.1: Causation Function
Case 1: RankDec(u, t) ⇒ C(u, t) = ρ(u, t)
Case 2: RankInc(u, t) ⇒ C(u, t) = ρ(u, t+ 1)
Case 3: RankSame(u, t) ⇒ C(u, t) is empty
The operating conditions for the causation function are outlined in table 2.1.
There are three cases for the causation function C(u, t) = v:
1. Node v was the next hop of u’s chosen path at time t. However, node v changed
its path at time t, causing u to choose a less preferred path at time t+ 1.
2. Node v advertised a new path at time t, causing u to choose a more preferred
path through v at time t+ 1.
3. v is empty, because u’s path did not change between times t and t+ 1.
Definition 10 (Causation Chain). A causation chain is a sequence of nodes where
each node yi−1 causes yi to change its current path. It is represented by Y =
〈y0 y1 . . . yk〉t, where:
C(yi, t+ i) = yi−1 for all 0 < i ≤ k
Time t is defined with respect to y0, and it takes i time steps to build the causation
chain up to node yi. An example of a causation chain can be seen in figure 2·1.
Definition 11 (Causation Cycle). A causation cycle is a causation chain with a
repeated node: Y = 〈y0 y1 . . . yk〉t, where y0 = yk. The size of the cycle is k. The
primary node of the causation cycle is y0 = yk. A causation cycle Y is simple if
C(y1, t+ k + 1) 6= y0
9Thus the following examples represent simple and non-simple cycles:
Simple: 〈y0 y1 y2 y0 y3〉
Non-Simple: 〈y0 y1 y2 y0 y1〉
10
Chapter 3
Gao-Rexford Model
This chapter will show that if a DPR instance conforms to a set of economic relation-
ships known as the Gao-Rexford model (Gao and Rexford, 2001), then its dynamic
behavior can be characterized, regardless of changes in topology or path preferences.
In particular, we will show that all causation chains have the property known as
“valley-free” and all causation cycles are simple. Any deviation from these properties
would imply that some nodes are operating in a non-economic fashion, forming the
basis for the Causation Logging Algorithm in chapter 5.
Gao and Rexford (Gao and Rexford, 2001) proposed restrictions on path rankings
that reflected the economic relationships in the internet:
• Every node is customer, peer, or provider to its neighboring nodes.
• A node cannot be a provider to itself. There are no customer-provider cycles.
• For all times, each node prefers a path through a customer over a path through
a peer or a provider. Likewise, each node prefers a path through a peer over a
path through a provider.
• Each node provides transit service only to its customers. Paths are forbidden
to have “valleys” as shown later in the chapter.
For simplicity, we will further restrict our attention to “strict” Gao-Rexford con-
ditions. The strict Gao-Rexford conditions restrict the standard Gao-Rexford condi-
tions by forbidding a node from being both a (direct or indirect) provider and a (direct
11
or indirect) peer to another node. Figure 3·1 shows a direct comparison between the
standard and strict Gao-Rexford models. 1
z
u peer
peer
provider
provider
Standard
z
u peer
peer
provider
provider
Strict
Figure 3·1: Strict and Standard Economic Relationships. In the strict
version, node u is no longer an indirect provider and peer to node z.
Gao and Rexford (Gao and Rexford, 2001) showed that standard (and thus the
strict as well) Gao-Rexford conditions are sufficient to guarantee stability in a static
graph. Thus both the strict and standard Gao-Rexford conditions are safe.
3.1 Modeling Strict Gao-Rexford using DPR
This chapter shows that every causation chain (including cycles) of a strict Gao-
Rexford DPR is valley-free and every causation cycle is simple. The restrictions of
the strict Gao-Rexford model enable equivalence classes of peers, as seen in figure 3·2.
Thus, the economic relationships between nodes can be represented using a pre-order
relation.
Definition 12 (Economic Operator). The economic relationship between nodes are
described using the operator $. This operator is essential for reasoning about the
economic relationships between nodes in both paths and causation chains. A tight
economic relation is defined by:
u $ v iff u $ v and u $ v
1In all other figures, peering relationships are represented by horizontal lines and provider-to-
customer relationships are represented by vertical/diagonal lines.
12
Figure 3·2: Equivalence classes of peers
and an equivalence relation is defined by:
u =$ v iff u $ v and u $ v
Economic relationships can be derived from the operator $:
• If u is a customer of v, then u ≺$ v.
• If u is a provider to v, then u $ v.
• If u is a peer to v, then u =$ v.
The transitive properties of the economic operator $ can be modeled using pre-order
conditions:
1. (reflexive) x $ x
2. (transitive) x $ y and y $ z implies x $ z
Note the following transitive relationships hold:
x $ y and y $ z implies x $ z
x $ y and y $ z implies x $ z
Definition 13 (Customer, Peer, Provider Paths). We define paths by the economic
13
relationship between a path’s starting node u and its next-hop. For paths P u:
Customer(P u) ⇔ u $ NextHop(P u)
Peer(P u) ⇔ u =$ NextHop(P u)
Provider(P u) ⇔ u ≺$ NextHop(P u)
Definition 14 (Valley-Free Sequences). Both paths and causation chains can be
characterized by the economic relationships between their adjacent nodes. A sequence
〈u0 . . . uk〉 has a valley with respect to an economic operator $ if there exists an i
such that 0 < i < k and:
ui−1 $ ui $ ui+1
The four cases of valleys can be seen in figure 3·3. Likewise, the sequence is valley-free
if for all i, 0 < i < k:
ui−1 $ ui ⇒ ui $ ui+1
and equivalently
ui $ ui+1 ⇒ ui−1 ≺$ ui
Every valley-free sequence is a series of zero or more ascending customer-to-provider
relationships, followed by an optional peer relationship, followed by a series of zero
or more descending provider-to-customer relationships.
Figure 3·3: Valleys
Definition 15 (Strict Gao-Rexford Instances). An economic DPR instance ($,
, G) satisfies the strict Gao-Rexford conditions if:
1. All paths which are not valley-free are forbidden.
HasValley(P )⇒ 〈〉  P
2. Customer paths are always preferred over peer/provider paths and peer paths
are always preferred over provider paths. Thus given paths P u1 and P
u
2 :
14
Customer(P u1 ) and not Customer(P
u
2 ) ⇒ P u1  P u2
Peer(P u1 ) and Provider(P
u
2 ) ⇒ P u1  P u2
3.2 Causation Chains in the Gao-Rexford Model
This chapter characterizes causation chains for strict Gao-Rexford DPR instances.
For convenience of notation, we will drop the time index of certain terms with respect
to a given chain Y = 〈y0 y1 . . . yk〉t, namely:
pi(yi) = pi(yi, t+ i)
pinext(yi) = pi(yi, t+ i+ 1)
ρ(yi) = ρ(yi, t+ i)
ρnext(yi) = ρ(yi, t+ i+ 1)
RankDec(yi) ⇔ RankDec(yi, t+ i)
RankSame(yi) ⇔ RankSame(yi, t+ i)
RankInc(yi) ⇔ RankInc(yi, t+ i)
Theorem 2. Every causation chain of a strict Gao-Rexford DPR instance ($,, G)
is valley-free.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain Y = 〈y0 y1 . . . yk〉t and an
index i such that 0 < i < k and yi−1 $ yi $ yi+1. Thus yi−1 and yi+1 are peers or
providers to yi.
The first part of this proof shows that if this is the case, then at no time during the
causation chain did yi have a customer path. The second part of this proof shows that
sometime during the causation chain yi+1 had a path through yi. Therefore yi+1 had
a realized valley path since yi did not have a customer path and yi is a customer of or
peer to yi+1. Since valley-paths are forbidden in strict Gao-Rexford DPR instances,
this results in a contradiction.
Since C(yi) = yi−1, either the first or second condition of causation from table 2.1
holds for yi at time t+ i.
15
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y0 y0 y0 y0
C(yi, t+ i) y0 y1 y2
t+ 1 – y0 y0
t+ 2 – – y1
t+ 3 y2 – –
Figure 3·4: Causation cycle Y = 〈y0 y1 y2 y0〉t with causation con-
ditions 1, 1, 2, and 2, respectively. A link failure between y0 and root
occurred at time t, causing y0 to have no path to root at time t + 1.
This causes y1 to switch to a less preferred path at time t + 2 and y2
to switch to a path through y1 at time t + 3. The cycle is closed with
y0 switching to a path via y2 at time t + 4. Note the existence of a
separate causation chain Y ′ = 〈y0 y2〉t.
Case: yi First Causation Condition
If the first condition holds for yi then: ρ(yi) = yi−1 and RankDec(yi), as shown
in figure 3·5. Therefore pi(yi) t+i pinext(yi). Let v = ρnext(yi). It cannot be that
v ≺$ yi. Otherwise, since pinext(yi) is a customer path and pi(yi) is not a customer
path (since ρ(yi) = yi−1 $ yi), by the conditions of strict Gao-Rexford instances:
pi(yi) ≺t+i pinext(yi), causing a contradiction as seen in figure 3·6. Thus v $ yi and
ρnext(yi) $ yi.
Case: yi Second Causation Condition
If the second condition of table 2.1 holds for yi then: ρnext(yi) = yi−1 and RankInc(yi)
as seen in figure 3·7.Therefore pi(yi) ≺t+i pinext(yi). Let v = ρ(yi). It cannot be that
v ≺$ yi. Otherwise, since pi(yi) is a customer path and pinext(yi) is not (since ρnext(yi) =
yi−1 $ yi), by the conditions of strict Gao-Rexford instances pi(yi) t+i pinext(yi),
causing a contradiction, as shown in figure 3·8. Thus ρnext(yi) $ yi and v $ yi.
So for both cases, at no time in the causation chain did yi have a customer path:
ρ(yi) $ yi and ρnext(yi) $ yi
16
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
root
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t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
Figure 3·5: Condition One: RankDec(yi)
root
yi-1
t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
Figure 3·6: Contradiction: RankInc(yi)
Case: yi+1 First Causation Condition
If the first condition of causation holds for yi+1, then ρ(yi+1) = yi. By lemma 1:
pi(yi+1) = 〈yi+1 pi(yi)〉. pi(yi+1) is a valley path since yi+1 $ yi $ ρ(yi). Since all
valley paths are forbidden, pi(yi+1) can never be realized, causing a contradiction.
Case: yi+1 Second Causation Condition
Similar arguments can be used if the second condition of causation holds for yi+1:
ρnext(yi+1) = yi. Thus by lemma 1: pinext(yi+1) = 〈yi+1 pinext(yi)〉. pinext(yi+1) is a
valley path since yi+1 $ yi $ ρnext(yi), and can never be realized. Thus in all cases
a contradiction occurs, proving the theorem.
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Figure 3·7: Condition Two: RankInc(yi)
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Figure 3·8: Contradiction: RankDec(yi)
3.3 Causation Cycles in the Gao-Rexford Model
This chapter describes properties of causation cycles in strict Gao-Rexford DPR in-
stances. Figure 3·4 represents a causation cycle, where node y0 loses a path to root
and reroutes through y2.
Lemma 2. Given a causation cycle Y = 〈y0 . . . yk〉t of a strict Gao-Rexford DPR
instance ($,, G), every node in Y is a provider to the primary node y0.
Proof. Let yi ∈ Y , where 0 < i < k. By theorem 2, Y is valley-free and either
yi−1 $ yi or yi $ yi+1. If the first case is true, then by the definition of valley-
free paths yj−1 ≺$ yj for all 0 < j < i, and by the transitive nature of economic
relationships, y0 ≺$ yi. If the second case is true, then by the definition of valley-
free paths yj $ yj+1 for all i < j < k, and by the transitive nature of economic
relationships, yi $ yk. Thus every node yi, is a provider to y0 = yk.
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Theorem 3. Every causation cycle Y = 〈y0 . . . yk〉t of a strict Gao-Rexford DPR
instance is simple.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain Y1 = 〈y0 y1 . . . yk y1〉t
where y0 = yk. From lemma 2, y0 ≺$ y1. However a new causation cycle Y t+12 can be
constructed such that:
Y t+12 = 〈y1 y2 . . . yk−1 yk y1〉
Thus by lemma 2, y1 ≺$ yk = y0 which is a contradiction.
Table 3.1: Variants of Gao-Rexford Models
Customer Has Economic Causation Vertical Horizontal Safe
Peer Paths Siblings Contracts Chains Cycles Cycles
Constrained No Strict No Valleys Simple No Yes
Constrained No Normal No Valleys Simple No Yes
Constrained Yes Strict No Canyons Simple Yes No
Constrained Yes Normal No Canyons Simple Yes No
Unconstrained No Strict No Ravines Simple Yes No
Unconstrained No Normal No Ravines Yes Yes No
Unconstrained Yes Strict No Ravines Simple Yes No
Unconstrained Yes Normal No Ravines Yes Yes No
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Chapter 4
Variants of the Gao-Rexford Model
The previous chapter described properties of causation chains/cycles in DPR in-
stances which conform to the strict Gao-Rexford model. Along with the standard
Gao-Rexford model, this chapter defines the properties of causation chains/cycles
of six other violations/variants. The results of this chapter will be used in chap-
ter 5 to diagnosis nonconformity to the Gao-Rexford model. All the variants of the
Gao-Rexford model can be defined by three binary parameters:
1. Strict or standard economic relationships
2. Allowance of sibling relationships
3. Preference of customer paths over peer paths
The first parameter was discussed in the previous chapter. We will describe binary
parameters 2 and 3.
4.1 Parameter 2: Allowance of Sibling Relationships
For Gao-Rexford DPR instances with sibling relationships, the set of forbidden paths
is reduced to allow transiting between peers. This peer transiting behavior is also
known as sibling relationships (Gao, 2001). Instead of “valley-free” paths, we refer
to allowed paths as being “canyon-free”.
Definition 16 (Canyon). We define a canyon to be a sequence of three nodes 〈a b c〉
satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
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1. a $ b ≺$ c
2. a $ b $ c
Each canyon-free path is a series of zero or more ascending customer-to-provider
edges, followed by zero or more peer edges, followed by zero or more descending
provider-to-customer edges, as shown in figure 4·1. Thus all paths with canyons in
Gao-Rexford DPR instances with sibling relationships are forbidden.
Valley:
Canyon:
Ravine:
Valley-Free Canyon-Free Ravine-Free
Figure 4·1: Valley, Canyon, and Ravine-Free Sequences
4.2 Parameter 3: Preference of Customer Paths over Peer
Paths
A Gao-Rexford model is unconstrained if peer paths can be ranked higher than cus-
tomer paths. As it will be shown later in this chapter, all causation chains of uncon-
strained Gao-Rexford models are “Ravine-Free”.
Definition 17 (Ravine). We define a ravine to be a sequence of three nodes 〈a b c〉
satisfying the condition:
a $ b $ c
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Thus a is a provider to b and c is not a customer to b. Ravines represent a subset
of canyons, which represent a subset of valleys, as seen in figure 4·1.
4.3 Dynamic Behavior of Gao-Rexford Variants
The parameters discussed in the previous chapter describe different variants to the
Gao-Rexford model. Each variant results in slightly different types of causation chains
and cycles. In order to illustrate these differences, we partition causation cycles in to
two categories: horizontal and vertical cycles.
Definition 18 (Horizontal Cycle). A causation cycle is horizontal if all adjacent
nodes in the cycle are peers.
Definition 19 (Vertical Cycle). A causation cycle is vertical if there is at least one
customer/provider relationship between adjacent nodes of the cycle. An example of a
simple vertical cycle can be found in figure 3·4. An example of a non-simple vertical
cycle can be found in figure 4·2.
Table 3.1 describes the properties of causation chains and cycles of all Gao-Rexford
model and its variants. The vertical/horizontal cycles columns describe the types of
causation cycles: “Yes” indicates both simple and non-simple cycles, whereas “Simple
Only” indicates the appearance of only simple cycles. The proofs for table 3.1 can be
found in (Epstein et al., 2008).
The first and second rows represent the strict and standard versions of the Gao-
Rexford model described in chapter 3. They represent the only variants which are
guaranteed to be safe. They represent conformity to the Gao-Rexford model. The
six other variants describe violations to the model, and thus such instances can be
potentially unsafe.
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t+3
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a b
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t+4
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a b
root
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Figure 4·2: A non-simple vertical cycle. Nodes a and b are peers.
Node c is a customer of a and b and the root node is customer of every
other node. Nodes a, b, and c always prefer a path through b, c, and a
over a direct path to root, respectively. Paths going through all nodes
a, b and c are forbidden. This DPR instance corresponds to an unsafe
“bad gadget” described in (Griffin et al., 2002). The corresponding
causation chain represents a non-simple cycle: Y = 〈b a c b a〉t.
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Chapter 5
Detecting Gao-Rexford Conformity
By examining the causation chains/cycles and economic relationships of a DPR in-
stance, one can determine whether the DPR instance conforms to the behavior pre-
dicted by the Gao-Rexford model. For any period of routing instability, a simple
distributive logging algorithm can be implemented by each Autonomous System. The
logs can be combined together at a central Internet Routing Repository (IRR) which
can detect any non-economic (Gao-Rexford) behavior. The results are completely
independent of dynamic changes in topology or path preferences.
Figure 5·1 describes the Causation Logging Algorithm, which represents the com-
putation and logging of the causation function during routing. Lines 2 and 3 represent
standard routing behavior, which determines node u’s chosen route for the next time
period. Lines 4 through 9 represent the logging of the causation tuples for the given
time period. Each causation tuple consists of:
{v, t− 1} causation neighbor v and previous time t− 1
$(v, u) v’s economic relationship with current node u
{u, t} node u and time t
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1: function Process(u, t)
2: Best(u, t)← maxt Choices(u, t)
3: pi(u, t+ 1)← Best(u, t)
4: if RankInc(u, t) then
5: v ← ρ(u, t+ 1)
6: else if RankDec(u, t) then
7: v ← ρ(u, t)
8: if v 6= ∅ then
9: Log
(
{v, t− 1}, $(v, u), {u, t}
)
Figure 5·1: Causation Logging Algorithm
5.1 Central IRR
The causation tuples from every node over a specific time span is sent to a central
IRR. The combined set of causation tuples T can be represented as:
(
{v, s}, $(v, u), {u, t}
)
∈ T
From T , the IRR creates a causation digraph Gc = (V c, Ec). The vertices, V c,
consist of the node/time pairs in T :
(
{v, s}, $(v, u), {u, t}
)
∈ T ⇒ {v, s} ∈ V c and {u, t} ∈ V c
The edges, Ec, have the exact same form as the tuples of T , representing directed
edges, annotated with economic relationships:(
{v, s}, $(v, u), {u, t}
)
∈ T ⇒
(
{v, s}, $(v, u), {u, t}
)
∈ Ec
Every path H in Gc represents a causation chain in the corresponding DPR model.
The path H also represents a causation cycle in the DPR instance if H contains two
elements which share a DPR node:
{u, s} ∈ H and {u, t} ∈ H
Figure 5·2 shows the causation tuples and corresponding causation graph of the
DPR instance shown in figure 3·4. The economic annotations of the edges in the
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Causation Tuples:(
{y0, t},≺$, {y1, t+ 1}
)(
{y0, t},≺$, {y2, t+ 1}
)(
{y1, t+ 1},=$, {y2, t+ 2}
)(
{y2, t+ 2},$, {y0, t+ 3}
)
Causation Graph:
{y0,t}
{y
1
,t+1} {y
2
,t+2}
{y0,t+3}
{y
2
,t+1}
Causation Chains:
〈y0 y1 y2 y0〉t
〈y0 y2〉t
Figure 5·2: Causation Graphs corresponding to the DPR instance
of figure 3·4. The horizontal arrow represents a causation tuple be-
tween peers. The diagonal arrows represent causation tuples between
providers and customers (with providers above the customers).
causation graph are represented by their slope: edges with horizontal slope are be-
tween peers, while edges with diagonal slopes are between customers and providers.
The paths in the causation graph show that the DPR instance had a simple vertical
causation cycle 〈y0 y1 y2 y0〉t.
Using the economic annotations of the edges, the IRR can analyze the causation
chains and cycles represented by the paths of Gc. The valleys, canyons, and ravines
for each causation chain can be determined. Causation cycles can be classified as be-
ing vertical, horizontal, and/or simple. As shown in figure 5·3, the IRR can determine
whether a DPR instance conforms to the Gao-Rexford model. Given nonconformity,
the causation chains/cycles are compared against the results of table 3.1 to eliminate
possible reasons for the violation. If a causation chain does not adhere to a partic-
ular violation/variant—for example, a non-simple vertical cycle in the (constrained,
sibling, strict) variant—then the cause for nonconformity cannot be due to that viola-
tion/variant. The outputs of figure 5·3 are sent to the offending nodes: the members
of the ravine, canyon, valley or cycle.
The running time for determining ravines, canyons and valleys is linear in the
number of edges: O(Ec). As shown in (Tarjan, 1973), the running time for finding
the number of elementary cycles is on the order of: O((V c + Ec)(N + 1)), where N
is the number causation cycles found. This is more tractable than determining if a
static BGP configuration is stable, which is NP-complete (Griffin et al., 2002).
26
1: if has ravine then
2: Output “No - not due to any variant”
3: else if has non-simple vertical cycle then
4: Output “No - not due to variants:
5: (constrained, sibling, *) or
6: (unconstrained, *, strict)”
7: else if has canyon then
8: Output “No - not due to variants:
9: (constrained, sibling, *)”
10: else if has valley, or horizontal cycle then
11: Output “No”
12: else
13: Output “Conforms”
Figure 5·3: IRR Characterization. Given the observed causation
chain, conformity to the Gao-Rexford model can be determined. In
the event of nonconformity, depending on the observation, certain vari-
ants of table 3.1 can be ruled out.
5.2 Asynchronicity
The Causation Logging Algorithm is based on the DPR model, which assumes syn-
chronous updates. However to be effectively applied to BGP inter-domain routing,
the Causation Logging Algorithm cannot assume synchronicity. In the asynchronous
version, every node broadcasts its current route between independent waiting inter-
vals. As shown in (Epstein et al., 2008), the theorems in chapters 3 and 4 still hold
for an asynchronous version of the DPR model.
The following changes can be made to the Causation Logging Algorithm. Each
node maintains a local time which it increments after each waiting interval. In each
broadcast, each node sends its current route and local time. Nodes maintain their
neighbor’s current local times. A path change causes a node u to log the following
causation tuple:
{v, tv} causation neighbor v and its local time tv
$(v, u) v’s economic relationship with node u
{u, tu} node u and its local time tu
The tuples are sent to the IRR, which computes Gao-Rexford conformity in the same
fashion as the original algorithm.
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